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A
mAbstract: We estimate the effect of active labour-market programmes on the exit
rate to regular employment for non-western immigrants in Denmark who receive
social assistance. We use the timing-of-events duration model and rich administrative
data. We find large positive post-programme effects, and, surprisingly, even most
in-programme effects are positive. The effects are largest for subsidized employment
programmes, but effects are also large and significant for direct employment
programmes and other programmes. Effects are larger if programmes begin after six
months of unemployment. Implications of our estimates are illustrated by calculating
effects on the duration to regular employment over a five-year period.
JEL classification codes: J64, J24, J68, J61, C41
Keywords: Programme evaluation; Duration analysis; Timing-of-events model1. Introduction
In most European countries employment rates of non-western immigrants are very
low compared to employment rates of natives (OECD 2005), and this has become a
major policy issue because of the important consequences for aggregate labour supply,
economic growth and the long-run fiscal sustainability issues. Furthermore, it is often
argued that labour market integration of immigrants may be important for social
integration and cohesion, and there may be long-term effects through integration
of children of immigrants.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of active labour market programmes (ALMPs)
on the duration until regular employment for non-western immigrants in Denmark
receiving social assistance (cash benefits).1 The reason why we focus on social assistance
recipients is that the majority of non-western immigrants in Denmark are not members of
an unemployment insurance fund, implying that they are not entitled to unemployment
insurance benefits when they become unemployed; instead they receive social assistance,
and they are heavily over-represented among social assistance recipients, especially among
long-term recipients. For instance, in 1998 (the second year of our estimation period)
immigrants from non-western countries made up 4.8% of the population and received
38% of the total amount of social assistance benefits; see Pedersen (2000). Immigrants
from western countries are much more similar to natives in terms of labour market
attachment and only few receive social assistance benefits.2013 Heinesen et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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labour market programmes administered by the job centres. Because a large fraction of
non-western immigrants are social assistance recipients, it is very important to assess
whether these programmes have positive effects on immigrants’ employment prospects.
If some programmes show positive effects, further targeting of such programmes
to immigrants may have large positive effects on labour market integration and, indirectly,
on social integration in general.
We use rich administrative data covering all immigrants in Denmark, and we employ
the timing-of-events duration model of Abbring and van den Berg (2003).2 We find
large positive post-programme effects, and, surprisingly, most in-programme effects are
positive too. We find the largest effects for subsidized employment programmes, but
effects are also large and significant for direct employment programmes as well as for
other programmes. Effects are larger for programmes beginning after six months of
unemployment. Implications of our estimates are illustrated by calculating marginal
effects on the expected duration to regular employment over a five-year period for
typical starting times and programme durations. Subsidized employment programmes
shorten the social assistance spell by about 10 months for women and 15 months
for men. The effect of direct employment programmes is 3.7 months for women
and 4.6 months for men, and the effect of other programmes is 1.5 month for
women and 2.6 months for men.
Only very few papers have investigated the effects of ALMPs specifically for
immigrants, but most of these studies find large and positive effects; see the survey
in Rinne (2012). The study most closely related to this paper is Clausen et al.
(2009) which investigate effects of programmes offered to newly arrived non-
western immigrants in Denmark. This is a much smaller and very different group
of immigrants compared to the sample of the present paper where more than 60%
had been living in Denmark for more than 5 years. Effects of ALMPs may be very
different for immigrants receiving social assistance 5, 10 or 20 years after immigra-
tion than for newly arrived immigrants who are offered ALMPs as part of an
‘introduction programme’. The former group is much more selective and may have
more serious social problems and health problems. Clausen et al. (2009) find that
post-programme effects on the hazard rate to regular employment of newly arrived
immigrants are significantly positive for wage subsidy programmes, but not for
other types of programmes. Bolvig et al. (2003) reach a similar conclusion investi-
gating effects of ALMPs for social assistance recipients in the second largest
municipality in Denmark, but they do not estimate separate effects for natives
and immigrants.
The overall finding in previous studies on programmes for unemployed workers is
that earnings effects as well as employment effects are small; see the surveys in Stanley
et al. (1999), Heckman et al. (1999), Kluve (2010), and Card et al. (2010). Stanley et al.
(1999) summarise the effects of several US programmes. They find that temporary
wage subsidy programmes increase the probability of finding jobs in the subsidy period,
but not in the long run, and that job search courses and counselling shorten unemploy-
ment duration. The surveys in both Stanley et al. (1999) and Heckman et al. (1999)
conclude that effects are heterogeneous: some ALMPs may have positive effects
for unemployed with a weak position in the labour market, but for other groups
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effects for non-western immigrants in Denmark are consistent with these previous
results, since these immigrants in general have a weak position in the Danish
labour market because of language problems and a low level of education or non-
transferable education from their country of origin. The findings in the surveys of
European labour market programmes by Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) are
similar to those for the US: ‘private-sector incentive programmes’ (including wage
subsidies) and ‘services and sanctions’ (including job search assistance, counselling,
and sanctions for non-compliance) typically have positive employment effects,
whereas ‘traditional labour market training’ (including classroom training and on-
the-job training) has much smaller and often insignificant effects, and ‘direct
employment programmes in the public sector’ are rarely effective and often have
negative employment effects. Card et al. (2010) do show, however, that these
negative effects tend to become smaller when effects are studied over a longer
time perspective.
Compared to the general findings in the literature, and also compared to the results
for newly arrived immigrants in Clausen et al. (2009), our results indicate very large
positive ALMP effects for the group of non-western immigrants. This suggests that
ALMPs should be applied more extensively for this group than was the case in
Denmark during our estimation period. A similar conclusion may apply for other
western countries.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting.
Section 3 develops the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data used in
the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes and discusses
policy implications.2. Institutional setting
In Denmark, membership of an unemployment insurance fund is voluntary, and
membership of a given fund may be restricted by education and previous employment.
Only members will receive UI benefits if they become unemployed. Non-insured
workers who become unemployed may instead receive social assistance benefits
which are means-tested. As discussed above, we focus on non-insured immigrants
in this paper because there are considerably more non-western immigrants who
are non-insured than insured, and, in particular, immigrants are over-represented
among long-term recipients of social assistance. Therefore, the effect of programmes
aimed at labour market integration of non-western immigrants receiving social assistance
is of particular interest.
Social assistance recipients will receive ALMP offers from the local authorities, and they
have to participate in such a programme in order to remain eligible for social security
benefits, which are of unlimited duration. A wide range of ALMPs are being used. In this
paper we distinguish between three types: employment with a wage subsidy (mainly in the
private sector), direct employment programme (mainly in the public sector), and other
programmes which include education, training, and counselling programmes.
According to national law, persons should be offered participation in a programme
within 12 months from the beginning of the social-assistance spell. However, there may
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group of non-western immigrants of which a large share is refugees (about 50%
are refugees or family reunified to a refugee; see Appendix). Participation in ALMPs is
described in Section 4.3. Econometric model
We use the timing-of-events duration model of Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
We model the duration of the social assistance spell to regular employment simul-
taneously with the duration from the beginning of the social assistance spell until
entry into active labour market programmes. The duration of the social assistance
spell includes the time spent in ALMPs. The model takes account of non-random
selection into these programmes with respect to observable and unobservable
covariates. Assuming mixed proportional hazard (MPH) rates and no anticipation
effects, the treatment effects (i.e. the effects of participating in labour market
programmes) are non-parametrically identified; see Abbring and van den Berg
(2003). The no-anticipation assumption requires that a treatment starting at time t
should not affect the outcome state (employment or non-employment) before time
t. This may be a reasonable assumption in the present application since typically
social assistance recipients are not able to predict neither time of treatment nor
the specific programme to which they may be assigned until a few days or weeks
before programme start (case workers even have the opportunity to assign a
programme starting the same day as the meeting with the client). One exception is
some types of longer education programmes related to the ordinary education sys-
tem which only begin a few times per year. Participation in such programmes may
in some cases be anticipated a few months in advance, but it is uncommon that
immigrants participate in this type of programmes. The kind of education prog-
rammes in which immigrants participate are typically a series of shorter courses in
the Danish language, in some cases combined with some sort of training
programme. Municipalities have a large degree of discretion regarding the timing
of treatment, some offer programmes at a very early stage of social assistance re-
ceipt, while others typically do not meet the 12-month criterion. In addition, there
is a significant variation regarding assignment to ALMPs between case workers
within municipalities, and finally programme participation decisions are taken at
meetings with case workers, the timing of which is also random to some extent.
Thus, the starting times vary a lot for each category of programmes, and for all
types of programmes taken together the standard deviation of duration until treat-
ment is 15 months; see Table 1 (which is discussed in detail in the next section).
There are general guidelines as to the choice of programme types, but they are
rather vague implying that in practice municipalities and case workers have a large
degree of discretion also in this respect.
Given the no-anticipation and MPH assumptions, no exclusion restrictions are
needed. The intuition behind the identification strategy intrinsic to the timing-of-events
model is that there is some random variation in the duration until treatment. This
enables a separation between the treatment effect and the unobserved heterogeneity,
which is assumed time-invariant.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of immigrants’ social assistance spells and ALMP participation
Social assistance
spells
ALMP spells Duration of ALMP
subspells (months)
Duration of spell until start
of ALMP (months)
Spells with employment destination
N per cent per cent Mean SD Mean SD N per cent
Females and males
Social assistance spells with ALMPs 25,541 38.3 100.0 5.8 6.1 13.4 15.3 6,664 26
- Employment with wage subsidy 1,893 2.8 7.4 5.3 4.2 8.6 10.2 959 51
- Direct employment programme 6,814 10.2 26.7 5.7 6.0 11.2 13.1 2,273 33
- Other programmes 16,834 25.2 65.9 5.9 6.3 14.8 16.4 3,432 20
Social assistance spells with no ALMP 41,227 61.7 15,916 39
All 66,768 100.0 5.8 6.1 13.4 15.3 22,580 34
Females
Social assistance spells with ALMPs 11,802 37.8 100.0 6.3 6.3 16.2 17.5 2,575 22
- Employment with wage subsidy 573 1.8 4.9 5.4 4.2 8.5 10.1 278 49
- Direct employment programme 2,958 9.5 25.1 6.2 6.1 13.1 14.9 953 32
- Other programmes 8,271 26.5 70.1 6.4 6.5 17.9 18.4 1,344 16
Social assistance spells with no ALMP 19,413 62.2 5,984 31
All 31,215 100.0 6.3 6.3 16.2 17.5 8,559 27
Males
Social assistance spells with ALMPs 13,739 38.6 100.0 5.3 5.9 10.9 12.7 4,089 30
- Employment with wage subsidy 1,320 3.7 9.6 5.2 4.3 8.7 10.2 681 52
- Direct employment programme 3,856 10.8 28.1 5.3 5.9 9.8 11.3 1,320 34
- Other programmes 8,563 24.1 62.3 5.3 6.0 11.7 13.6 2,088 24
Social assistance spells with no ALMP 21,814 61.4 9,932 46
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and time-varying variables are used for modelling in- and post-programme effects
of ALMPs.
Normalising the time at which immigrants begin a social assistance spell to zero, the
non-negative stochastic variables Tu and Tp measure duration until employment and
duration until programme participation, respectively. By construction, Tp< Tu. If Tp <Tu,
the immigrant participates in a programme, and if Tp = Tu, he does not (the duration until
participation is right-censored).
Let x(t) be a vector of observed time-varying variables, and let vu and νp = (νp1,..., νpJ)
denote unobserved variables affecting the hazard rates to employment and to participa-





  ¼ λpj tp  exp x tp βpj þ νpj  ð1Þ
where λpj(tp) are piecewise constant baseline hazard rates,
λpj tp
  ¼ exp XM
m¼1
γpjm1 hm−1< tp < hm
n o !
; ho ¼ 0; hM ¼ ∞; ho <⋯ < hM ð2Þ
In this application, where the time unit is months, h1 = 3, h2 = 6, h3 = 12, h4 = 24.The hazard rate to programme participation is the sum of the hazard rates to the
specific programmes:
θpðtpjx tp ; νpÞ ¼XJ
j¼1




Participation in the J different programmes is denoted by two time-varying 1×J-di-mensional vectors of dummy variables, d1(t) and d2(t). The jth element of d1(t) is equal
to 1 if the individual is participating in programme j at time t, and 0 otherwise; at most,
one element of d1(t) is equal to 1 at time t. Similarly, the jth element of d2(t) is
equal to 1 if the individual participated in programme j before time t, but is no
longer participating, and 0 otherwise. We only consider effects of the first programme
during a social assistance spell; if a person participates in a second programme,
the observation is right-censored at the time this participation begins.
The exit rate to employment is given by
θu tu x tuð Þ; d1 tuð Þ; d2 tuð Þ; νuÞ ¼ λu tuð Þ exp x tuð Þβu þ d1 tuð Þδ1 þ d2 tuð Þδ2 þ νu
 
ð4Þ
where the baseline hazard λu(tu) has a form similar to (2), and β, δ1 and δ2 are vectors
of parameters; β is the effect of the control variables, δ1 the in-programme effect, and
δ2 the post-programme effect after completed programme participation. The model
takes account of endogeneity of d1(t) and d2(t) through possible correlation between
the unobserved variables vu and vp.
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otherwise; similarly, let cj = 1 if the person participates in programme j. Then the











θuðtujx tuð Þ; d1 tuð Þ; d2 tuð Þ; νuÞc
 exp −∫tp0 θpðsjx sð Þ; νpÞds−∫tu0 θuðsjx sð Þ; d1 sð Þ; d2 sð Þ; νuÞds
#h
ð5Þ




where F is the distribution function of (vu ,vp). We take account of the fact that a given
person may have more than one social assistance spell. To simplify the estimation, we
apply a discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Specifically, we assume
that (vu ,vp) has a discrete distribution with 2×2 mass points. This implies that the
unobserved components of the selection into the J different programmes are perfectly
correlated, but the correlation between vu and vp is unrestricted.
3.1 Marginal effects on the hazard rate and on the duration to employment
The marginal effects of the control variables on the hazard rate to employment are
given by the coefficients βu (ignoring the effects via programme participation). Thus,
the coefficient of the hth explanatory variable, βuh, is equal to the change in the loga-
rithm of the hazard rate to employment when this variable is changed by 1 unit holding
all other variables constant. Similarly, δ1 and δ2 are the marginal in-programme and
post-programme effects, respectively, of participation in labour market programmes on
the log hazard rate to employment.
The total effect of participation in a specific programme on the expected duration
until employment depends of course on δ1 and δ2, but also on the timing and duration
of the programme and on the basic level of the hazard rate to employment (since δ1
and δ2 affect the hazard rate multiplicatively) determined by individual characteristics.
We calculate the marginal effects of programme participation for a ‘reference person’
given a range of typical programme starting times and durations. These marginal
effects are calculated as the difference in expected mean duration to employment
with and without programme participation. In these calculations we use restricted
mean durations, i.e. expected mean durations up to a predetermined endpoint,
Tmax (which is taken to be five years).
Let z(t) = (x(t), d1(t), d2(t)) denote the vector of covariates. Let z
1(t) denote the covariates
when an individual is assigned to a given programme at a given time and with a given
duration, and let z0(t) denote covariates when the individual is not assigned to any
programme. Then the marginal effect of this programme is defined as the difference in
restricted expected durations:
M ¼ ET max Tu z1 tð Þ−ET max Tu z0 tð Þ
		 ð7Þ
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to time Tmax
ET max Tu z tð Þ ¼ E ∫T max0 S rð Þdr
	 
	 ð8Þ
and the survivor function is calculated from the hazard rate:
S tð Þ ¼ exp −∫t0θu s z sð ÞÞdsj Þð
 ð9Þ
Details on the calculation of marginal effects are described in Section 5.4. Data
We use data from several administrative registers, which are collected and merged
by Statistics Denmark. Our data set covers the period 1984–2004 and contains all
immigrants in Denmark, but we restrict the analysis to immigrants from non-western
countries.
We further restrict the sample to persons who were residents in Denmark in 1997 or
1998 due to the fact that there was a major institutional change in 1999 affecting newly
arrived immigrants, and also that the administrative data on ALMP participation for
immigrants who got their residence permit in 1999 are incomplete. Also, we restrict
the analysis to immigrants who began a social assistance spell between January 1997
and December 2003 due to the fact that data on participation in ALMPs are only available
from 1997 onwards. Finally, we restrict the analysis to social assistance spells where the
immigrants were 18–66 years of age when the spell began.
The final estimation sample contains 66,768 social assistance spells, 31,215 for
women and 35,553 for men; see Table 1.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows figures for both women and men. For 38% of the
social assistance spells, the immigrant is participating in an activation programme. Of
those who participate in programmes, 7.4% concerns employment with a wage subsidy,
and 26.7% direct employment programmes. Durations of each type of activation
programme vary a lot (mean duration is 5–6 months with a standard deviation of 4–6
months), but one reason for this is that some programmes are interrupted, for instance
because the participant finds a job. There is also a large variation in the time of entry
into programmes: On average, immigrants who participate in a programme enter about
13 months after the start of the social assistance spell, and the standard deviation is 15
months. 34% of all the immigrant social assistance spells have employment as destination
state. The percentage is 39 for spells not involving ALMP participation and 26 for spells
with ALMP participation, varying from 51% for employment with wage subsidy to 20 for
‘other programmes’.
The two lower panels in Table 1 show figures for women and men, separately. The
fraction participating in employment programmes is larger for men, whereas the fraction
participating in ‘other programmes’ is larger for women. The average duration of direct
employment programmes and ‘other programmes’ is about 1 month longer for women
than for men, and women are enrolled in these programmes much later than men (about
3 and 6 months later, respectively). The probability of employment as the destination state
is considerably larger for men than for women, especially for social assistance spells not
involving ALMP participation and for spells with participation in ‘other programmes’.
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longer for women than for men. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier survival functions. For women, the probability that a social assistance
spell lasts at least 12, 24, 48 and 84 months is 79, 71, 61 and 54%, respectively. For
men the corresponding percentages are 67, 54, 43 and 37.
We estimate separate models for men and women. Control variables in the analyses
are measured in the year where the social assistance spell began. Controls are variables
for years since migration, country of origin, type of residence permit, age, whether the
person has children in different age groups, whether the person is single, working
experience in Denmark, type of municipality, education, health indicators based on the
number of yearly doctor visits, the local unemployment rate in the commuting area of
the municipality, and the calendar year in which the social assistance spell began.
Appendix contains descriptive statistics for the control variables. Of particular interest
are the controls for previous labour market careers in Denmark. Thus, only 17.6% of
the females and 29.5% of the males had at least 1 year of working experience in
Denmark, and the shares with no Danish working experience at all was 60 and 42.6%,
respectively. This in spite of the fact that more than 60% had been in Denmark for
more than 5 years and about 37% for more than 10 years.
Dividing the social assistance spells by participation in ALMPs, tables in the Appendix
show for females and males, respectively, the means of control variables for each type
of ALMP. These tables also show two-sample t test statistics of equality with the non-
participation groups. Many of the t statistics are significant, in some cases because of
substantial differences between the groups, but also because of the large sample sizes.
The pattern of differences between groups is rather similar for females and males: The
share with at least 5 years since migration is larger for those participating in ‘other
ALMPs’ than in the control group of non-participants; the share of Somalis is smaller
among those participating in wage subsidy and direct employment programmes than
in the control group, whereas the opposite is true for ‘other ALMPs’. The share of
Pakistanis is smaller in all three treatment groups compared to the control group. For
females, the share who are family-reunified to a refugee is smaller for wage subsidyFigure 1 Kaplan-Meier survival functions (survival until regular employment).
Heinesen et al. IZA Journal of Migration , : Page 10 of 22
http://www.izajom.com/content///
2013, 2:15
.i j .co /content 2/1/15and direct employment programmes, but larger for ‘other ALMPs’ compared to the
control group. The share with positive host country working experience is consider-
ably smaller for direct employment and especially ‘other ALMPs’ compared to the con-
trol group, whereas the share with some working experience, but less than a year, is
larger for wage subsidy participants than for the control group. The share living outside
the metropolitan area of Copenhagen is larger among wage subsidy and direct employ-
ment participants compared to the control group, but the opposite is true for ‘other
ALMPs’, especially for males. The share with a Danish education is smaller for ‘other
ALMPs’ participants. The share with many GP visits is smaller among participants in
wage subsidy programmes. These differences between treatment and control groups illus-
trate that selection into programmes is not random and need to be modelled. In the esti-
mations we control for all the observable characteristics listed in tables of the Appendix
in the hazards to employment and programme participation, and we also take account of
unobserved heterogeneity as discussed in Section 3.5. Results
Table 2 shows the main estimation results. The first columns show the estimation
result for women, and the last columns the result for men. Table 2 shows results for
parameters related to ALMP participation only. Estimated parameters of other explanatory
variables are shown in the Appendix. For each of the three types of ALMPs, Table 2 shows
parameter estimates for in-programme and post-programme effects. Furthermore, we allow
these parameters to differ according to whether the immigrant entered the programmeTable 2 Estimates of effects of participation in ALMPs on the hazard rate to employment
Females Males
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
ALMP spell begins less than 6 months after start of social assistance spell
In-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy −0.2394 0.1505 −0.1887 0.0917 **
Direct employment programme 0.4131 0.0702 *** 0.3791 0.0537 ***
Other ALMPs 0.1693 0.0616 *** 0.1588 0.0446 ***
Post-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 1.4287 0.1333 *** 1.2430 0.0805 ***
Direct employment programme 0.6844 0.0920 *** 0.3757 0.0718 ***
Other ALMPs 0.2369 0.0769 *** 0.1240 0.0570 **
ALMP spell begins at least 6 months after start of social assistance spell
In-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 1.3192 0.1786 *** 0.8382 0.1100 ***
Direct employment programme 1.5442 0.0695 *** 1.0925 0.0607 ***
Other ALMPs 0.9390 0.0563 *** 0.7245 0.0505 ***
Post-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 2.4127 0.1235 *** 1.8976 0.0738 ***
Direct employment programme 1.2847 0.0871 *** 0.4565 0.0861 ***
Other ALMPs 0.5277 0.0701 *** 0.3266 0.0607 ***
Note: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Parameter estimates for the other explanatory
variables and for the duration dependent constant terms are shown in the Appendix.
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shows for each gender six estimates of in-programme effects and six estimates of
post-programme effects. All estimates of post-programme effects are positive and
clearly significant. Employment with a wage subsidy has the largest effect followed
by direct employment programmes. For all three types of ALMPs, the post-programme
effects on the hazard rate to employment are larger if the activation period begins after
six months (rather than during the first six months of the social assistance spell).
Somewhat surprisingly, most in-programme effects are also positive, indicating that
ALMP participation increases the hazard rate to ordinary employment also during
participation. The standard finding here is one of lock-in effects during programme
participation. The only exception is for subsidized employment spells which begin less
than six months after the start of the social assistance spell; here we do find a lock-in
effect, but it is only marginally significant. Clausen et al. (2009) also find positive, but insig-
nificant, in-programme effects for subsidized employment programmes for newly arrived
immigrants. Another surprising feature of the estimates is that the positive in-programme
effect is larger than the post-programme effect for direct employment programmes and
‘other programmes’ beginning at least six months after the start of the social assistance spell
(and for males the two types of effects are about equal in size for direct employment and
‘other’ programmes beginning within the first six months of the social assistance spell).
One reason why the estimated in-programme effects are positive and rather large
may be that immigrants on social assistance benefits in general have weak qualifica-
tions, including weak host country language proficiency, and only a limited knowledge
of the Danish labour market. Participating in ALMPs may therefore be particularly
important for immigrants’ employment chances, also because participation may
serve as a positive signal to employers who may have more difficulties assessing
the qualifications of immigrants than of natives.
The estimated parameters – and thereby the relative effects on the hazard rate to
employment – are generally larger for women than for men, but the initial level of the
hazard rate to employment is considerably lower for women than for men. The post-
programme parameter of subsidized employment starting after six months for women
is 2.4 indicating a tenfold increase in the hazard rate to employment. The corresponding
parameter for men (1.9) indicates a fivefold increase in the hazard rate. The corresponding
in-programme parameters of 1.3 and 0.84 indicate increases in the hazard rate to
employment of 277% and 132%, respectively.
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of participation in activation programmes on the
restricted mean duration to employment over a five-year period, calculated from a largeTable 3 Marginal effects of labour market programmes: Change in restricted mean











No ALMP 55.0 42.4
Employment with wage subsidy 45.1 −9.9 1.3 27.3 −15.1 1.0
Direct employment programme 51.4 −3.7 0.5 37.8 −4.6 0.6
Other ALMPs 53.5 −1.5 0.2 39.8 −2.6 0.4
Note: The calculation of marginal effects is described in the text.
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The characteristics chosen for this person (which affect the size of the marginal effects,
but not their sign or statistical significance) are given by the reference categories
of each set of categorised variables (less than 5 years since migration, from
former Yugoslavia, refugee, age above 45 years, has children below 2 years of age
(but no older children), cohabiting, no working experience in Denmark, lives in a
big city, education unknown, 1–4 visits to the doctor, the social assistance spell
began in 1997) and by the average of the local unemployment rate. If such a person did
not participate in any activation programme, the restricted mean duration to employment
would be 55 months for a woman and 42.4 months for a man (see the first row in Table 3).
These numbers are very large; the maximum would be 60 months (given that it is
restricted to be at most 5 years).
Given the values of the control variables, the restricted mean duration when participating
in a given programme depends on the duration until entering the programme and
the duration of the programme. Starting time and duration of a given programme
vary a lot (see Table 1). Therefore, we calculate ‘the’ marginal effect of a given
programme as an average over several typical variants of the programme defined
by starting time and duration. Specifically, we use the following simplifying assumptions.
Programme spells may have three different starting times and durations defined by
the first, second and third quartile in the observed distributions of starting times
and durations (for women and men, respectively). These quartiles are shown in
Appendix. Thus, there are nine different types of a given programme, and it is assumed
that each type has equal probability 1/9.3
Participation in ALMPs leads to a large reduction in the restricted mean duration to
employment as shown in Table 3. Employment with a wage subsidy shortens the
restricted mean duration by 10 months for women and by 15 months for men, which
are very large effects. The effects of direct employment programmes and ‘other ALMPs’
are smaller, but also large; they reduce restricted mean durations by about 4 and 2
months, respectively. Again, the estimated effects are larger for men than for women.
The estimated marginal effects in Table 3 are clearly significant. Standard errors of
the marginal effects are calculated from simulations of the estimated parameters. Given
the estimated parameters and their estimated covariance matrix, we draw 500 random
parameter vectors, and calculate the marginal effects for each parameter vector. The
estimated standard error of the marginal effect of a given programme is the standard
deviation of the 500 calculated marginal effects of this programme.
We conducted several robustness checks in terms of model specification, e.g. changing
the 6 months limit in distinguishing between early and late beginning of programmes,
changing the specification of control variables, and changing the specification of the
piecewise-constant intervals of the baseline hazard step functions, but the main
results of large and significant positive effects of ALMPs are very robust. As an
illustration, the Appendix shows estimation results with a less restrictive baseline hazard
function than in the main specification of Table 2, i.e. with 7 piecewise-constant
intervals (instead of 5): 0–2, 2–4, 4–6, 6–9, 9–12, 12–24 and 24- months. All point
estimates of in-programme and post-programme effects are even larger with this
less restrictive baseline hazard than in Table 2, although for most parameters the
differences are not statistically significant.
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same methods as in this paper and found significant effects for subsidized employment
(a reduction in the restricted mean duration to employment of about four months
over a four-year period), but not for direct employment programmes or other
programmes. There may be several explanations for the large ALMP effects which
we estimate in this paper compared to Clausen et al. (2009). The effects in Table 3
are calculated over a longer time horizon (5 years instead of 4), but more importantly, the
two samples of immigrants are very different. The group studied in the present paper is a
much more selective group of immigrants, the majority of whom had been living in
Denmark for many years and at the same time with very limited working experience in
Denmark, who were older, and who had more health problems (measured by GP visits).
Thus, this group of immigrants have a very weak attachment to the labour market and
their basic hazard rate to employment is very low (see Figure 1). Given this weak back-
ground, ALMPs may help these immigrants to obtain more basic knowledge of the
Danish labour market (and society in general) and provide contacts to firms. This is of
course a general purpose of ALMPs, but it may be particularly important for groups with
a very weak position in the labour market and a very limited network. In particular, this
may be one of the reasons why we find positive in-programme effects and positive effects
of direct employment programmes (which are often found to have small and insignificant
effects for natives). The earlier study by Clausen et al. (2009) focused on all newly arrived
immigrants who arrived later (from 1999 onwards) than the group studied in the present
paper and received a more comprehensive ‘introduction programme’ including extensive
courses in the Danish language and society, and regular meetings with case workers, and
in addition more extensive offers of ALMPs. Therefore, the marginal effect of
ALMPs may be smaller for this group which also includes a larger share with a
strong commitment and ability to work (because it is not selected in terms of labour
market success in the host country).
A qualitative case study (Järvinen, 2007) casts light on characteristics related to
employment prospects and ALMP participation of a selected group of non-western
immigrants who had been without a job and dependent on social assistance over a long
period of time. The study is based on interviews with case workers and analysis of 100
case files. Although people who receive social assistance are obliged to apply for jobs
and/or participate in ALMPs or other activities aiming at improving their chances of
employment, these requirements may typically be more difficult to uphold for non-
western immigrants. Thus, many non-western immigrants face social problems some of
which are related to culture and norms, including traditional gender roles from their
country of origin. Typically, males in this group do want to work, but many have
unrealistic expectations as to which type of job they can get or which type of Danish
education they are able to complete. Perceptions of gender roles are a barrier for
both males and females. For instance, many males do not want to work with
female colleagues, and many females do not want a job at all and try to avoid
participation in ALMPs, often because their husband is against it. Another important
barrier is perceptions of health problems. Many claim that they have health problems
which are not confirmed by doctors, but at the same time they are not active in dealing
with these problems, e.g. through change of life style. Health problems are often used as
an argument to postpone participation in ALMPs, especially by women. It is likely that
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studied in the present paper, so the characteristics discussed above may help explain why
social assistance spells are very long in our data, why women are enrolled in ALMPs
much later than men, and why we find large positive ALMP effects. The last feature may
in part be due to possible effects of ALMP participation on overcoming cultural barriers
to labour market integration.
Only few papers have estimated ALMP effects specifically for immigrants. Rinne (2012)
survey studies on effects of ALMPs specifically targeted towards immigrants and also studies
on effects of more general ALMPs estimated separately for immigrants and natives. Direct
comparison with our results is difficult because of important differences in terms of out-
come variables, types of ALMPs, types of effects and methods, but most of these studies find
large and significant effects for immigrants. Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen (2010) find large
positive effects on employment and earnings of a programme for immigrants consisting of a
sequence of training and subsidized employment in Finland. Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein
(2010) find positive employment and earnings effects of public training programs for high-
skilled female immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel. Aldashev et al. (2010) find
positive effects of aptitude tests and skill provision for immigrants in Germany, whereas
training programmes have no effects and job search programmes affects females negatively
and have no effects for males. Caliendo and Kühn (2011) find positive effects of start-up
programmes for both immigrants and natives in Germany. Bergemann et al. (2011) find
positive ex ante/threat effects of ALMPs on search effort for Eastern European immigrants
in Germany, whereas there is no effect for Turkish immigrants.
Comparing our results to the broader literature on effects of ALMPs on labour market
outcomes (see the surveys in Stanley et al. 1999; Heckman et al. 1999; Kluve and Schmidt
2002; Kluve 2010; Card et al. 2010), the positive effect of employment with a wage subsidy
on the hazard rate to regular employment is consistent with most previous studies. Our
finding of significant and rather large effects for direct employment programmes is less
consistent with previous findings, since most studies find only small and often insignificant
effects. Our category ‘other programmes’, for which we find a small but significant effect,
includes very different programmes such as training, special employment programmes
and counselling. Most previous studies find positive effects of counselling, marginally
positive effects of special employment programmes and small positive or insignificant
effects of training.6. Discussion and conclusion
Using the timing of events duration model and a large administrative data set, this
study finds large and substantial positive effects of having participated in ALMPs on
the hazard rate to regular employment for immigrants receiving social assistance in
Denmark. We estimate separate effects for three categories of programmes, and we
allow both in-programme and post-programme effects to differ according to whether
the program began before or after 6 months. The post-programme effects are largest
for subsidized employment programmes. We also find positive in-programme effects
except for subsidized employment programmes starting early. Both in-programme and
post-programme effects are much larger when the program begins at least six months
after the start of the social assistance spell.
Heinesen et al. IZA Journal of Migration , : Page 15 of 22
http://www.izajom.com/content///
2013, 2:15
.i j .co /content 2/1/15The total effect of ALMP participation depends on both in-programme and post-
programme effects. To assess the overall effect, we calculate the marginal effects on the
mean duration to regular employment over a five-year period, given a range of typical
starting times and durations of ALMP sub-spells. Subsidized employment programmes
reduce the duration of social assistance spells by 10–15 months, direct employment
programmes reduce it by about 4 months, and other programmes by about 2 months.
The finding that subsidized employment is the most effective type of ALMP is consistent
with an earlier study focussing on newly arrived immigrants and with other studies of
ALMP effects for unemployed in general. However, this type of ALMP is by far the least fre-
quently applied in Denmark; only 7.4% of ALMPs offered to immigrants on social assistance
are subsidized employment programmes (4.9% for females and 9.6% for males). Our results
thus indicate that labour market integration of immigrants may be improved considerably
by targeting subsidized employment programmes to unemployed immigrants.
Since we also estimate considerable positive effects of direct employment prog-
rammes and other programmes for immigrants – effects which are larger than similar
effects for unemployed in general found in other studies – offering these programmes
to a larger number of unemployed immigrants may also be beneficial to labour market
integration and labour supply in general.
However, even though our results indicate large beneficial effects of an intensified
use of ALMPs for immigrants, it may not be optimal to offer these programmes at a
very early state of the unemployment/social assistance spell since our estimates indicate
much larger positive effects on the hazard rate to employment if the ALMPs begin after
six months of social assistance receipt. Such a decision requires weighing the costs of
programmes against the saved social assistance.
In conclusion, we have found very large positive employment effects of ALMPs for
non-western immigrants, suggesting a much more active role for activation policies in
national strategies for integrating immigrants into the country. Also, we would defin-
itely advocate more research on the topic.Endnotes
1 Non-western countries are defined as countries which are not Nordic, not in the
EU (as of May 2004), and not the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland,
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, or San Marino.
2 The timing-of-events duration model has been used to evaluate ALMPs in several
previous studies; see e.g., Richardson and van den Berg (2001), Bolvig et al. (2003), van
den Berg et al. (2004), Abbring et al. (2005), Crépon et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2005,
2008), Clausen et al. (2009), and Rosholm and Svarer (2008).
3 Results are not sensitive to this assumption of equal weighting of the nine combinations
of pre-programme and in-programme durations. If instead we calculate the probability of
being in a certain cell by using the conditional distribution of in-programme duration,
i.e. conditional on being in a certain quantile of the pre-programme duration, we
obtain weights to the nine different combinations of durations for each programme which
are different from 1. The smallest weight is 0.67 and the largest is 1.26, but in most cases
the weights are close to 1, and the calculated marginal effects are very similar to those
reported in Table 3 using equal weighting. In all cases differences are less than 0.1 month.
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Tables 4, 5, 6 show descriptive statistics for control variables, and Table 7 shows parameter
estimates for control variables. Table 8 shows characteristics of ALMP spells used
to calculate marginal effects, namely the quartiles in the distributions of duration
of social assistance spells until start of programme and time spent in the programme,
respectively. Table 9 shows parameter estimates of ALMP variables in an alternative model
with more narrow intervals of the piecewise-constant baseline hazard step function.Table 4 Descriptive statistics for controls
Females Males
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Years since migration: 5-9 0.248 0.432 0 1 0.232 0.422 0 1
Years since migration: 10-19 0.183 0.386 0 1 0.235 0.424 0 1
Years since migration: 20- 0.166 0.372 0 1 0.176 0.381 0 1
From Turkey 0.151 0.358 0 1 0.114 0.318 0 1
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia) 0.090 0.286 0 1 0.082 0.274 0 1
From Africa (except Somalia) 0.071 0.256 0 1 0.081 0.273 0 1
From Somalia 0.096 0.294 0 1 0.120 0.325 0 1
From American countries 0.021 0.144 0 1 0.017 0.129 0 1
From Afghanistan 0.018 0.135 0 1 0.023 0.148 0 1
From Iraq 0.076 0.264 0 1 0.118 0.322 0 1
From Iran 0.050 0.218 0 1 0.063 0.243 0 1
From Sri Lanka 0.037 0.188 0 1 0.025 0.155 0 1
From other Asian countries 0.088 0.284 0 1 0.044 0.205 0 1
From Pakistan 0.043 0.203 0 1 0.037 0.188 0 1
From Libanon 0.059 0.236 0 1 0.087 0.282 0 1
From other countries 0.041 0.199 0 1 0.043 0.203 0 1
Family reunified to a refugee 0.128 0.334 0 1 0.044 0.204 0 1
Family reunified to non-refugee 0.169 0.375 0 1 0.099 0.298 0 1
EU residence permit 0.035 0.183 0 1 0.020 0.140 0 1
Unknown type of residence permit 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.343 0.475 0 1
Age 16-24 0.215 0.411 0 1 0.189 0.391 0 1
Age 25-34 0.400 0.490 0 1 0.378 0.485 0 1
Age 35-44 0.264 0.441 0 1 0.309 0.462 0 1
Children 3–6 years of age 0.194 0.395 0 1 0.122 0.327 0 1
Children 7–17 years of age 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.123 0.329 0 1
No children 0.321 0.467 0 1 0.531 0.499 0 1
Single 0.331 0.471 0 1 0.423 0.494 0 1
Working experience up to 1 year 0.224 0.417 0 1 0.279 0.448 0 1
Working experience 1–3 years 0.112 0.315 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1
Working experience 3 years or more 0.064 0.245 0 1 0.120 0.325 0 1
Lives in provincial town municipality 0.343 0.475 0 1 0.326 0.469 0 1
Lives in a rural district 0.113 0.317 0 1 0.097 0.296 0 1
Danish education 0.166 0.372 0 1 0.217 0.413 0 1
Years of Danish education 1.694 3.858 0 20 2.205 4.281 0 20
Foreign education 0.346 0.476 0 1 0.325 0.468 0 1
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for controls (Continued)
Years of foreign education 3.876 5.656 0 18 3.957 5.962 0 18
No visits to doctors 0.150 0.357 0 1 0.241 0.428 0 1
5-9 visits to doctors 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.207 0.405 0 1
10-19 visits to doctors 0.220 0.414 0 1 0.108 0.310 0 1
20 or more visits to doctors 0.076 0.265 0 1 0.025 0.156 0 1
Local unemployment rate x 10 0.621 0.150 0.326 1.361 0.622 0.150 0.317 1.361
Social assistance spell began 1998 0.192 0.394 0 1 0.194 0.396 0 1
Social assistance spell began 1999 0.178 0.382 0 1 0.191 0.393 0 1
Social assistance spell began 2000 0.110 0.313 0 1 0.111 0.314 0 1
Social assistance spell began 2001 0.108 0.311 0 1 0.105 0.307 0 1
Social assistance spell began 2002 0.098 0.297 0 1 0.095 0.293 0 1
Social assistance spell began 2003 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.080 0.271 0 1
Note. Reference categories are: Years since migration less than five years; from former Yugoslavia; refugee; 45–66 years
of age; children 0–2 years of age; married or cohabiting; no working experience (in Denmark); lives in the metropolitan
area of Copenhagen or one of the three largest provincial cities in Denmark; education unknown; 1–4 visits to doctors;
spell began in 1997.
Table 5 Means of controls for females by participation in ALMPs and two-sample t test
statistics of equality with the non-participation group
No ALMP Wage subsidy Direct employment Other ALMPs
Variable mean mean t mean t mean t
Years since migration: 5-9 0.258 0.236 −1.20 0.255 −0.31 0.220 −6.81
Years since migration: 10-19 0.192 0.222 1.68 0.189 −0.32 0.154 −7.78
Years since migration: 20- 0.174 0.147 −1.81 0.162 −1.56 0.149 −5.11
From Turkey 0.155 0.144 −0.77 0.139 −2.34 0.147 −1.77
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia) 0.091 0.084 −0.52 0.109 2.98 0.082 −2.30
From Africa (except Somalia) 0.074 0.045 −3.18 0.054 −4.37 0.070 −1.16
From Somalia 0.083 0.036 −5.92 0.068 −3.06 0.140 13.06
From American countries 0.023 0.018 −0.97 0.017 −2.32 0.018 −3.15
From Afghanistan 0.017 0.012 −1.09 0.018 0.46 0.024 3.73
From Iraq 0.068 0.044 −2.70 0.058 −2.21 0.103 9.17
From Iran 0.053 0.045 −0.80 0.047 −1.31 0.044 −3.03
From Sri Lanka 0.038 0.054 1.62 0.055 3.68 0.024 −6.46
From other Asian countries 0.093 0.150 3.78 0.083 −1.82 0.074 −5.38
From Pakistan 0.049 0.015 −6.39 0.029 −5.76 0.037 −4.41
From Libanon 0.058 0.037 −2.61 0.055 −0.73 0.066 2.41
From other countries 0.041 0.029 −1.69 0.037 −1.04 0.046 2.18
Family reunified to a refugee 0.120 0.072 −4.33 0.078 −7.59 0.169 10.52
Family reunified to non-refugee 0.175 0.149 −1.73 0.139 −5.19 0.167 −1.69
EU residence permit 0.036 0.019 −2.84 0.020 −5.20 0.038 0.92
Unknown type of residence permit 0.334 0.325 −0.43 0.297 −4.04 0.268 −11.06
Age 16-24 0.213 0.232 1.06 0.255 4.85 0.205 −1.54
Age 25-34 0.393 0.404 0.55 0.370 −2.31 0.428 5.49
Age 35-44 0.261 0.273 0.65 0.283 2.49 0.264 0.57
Children 3–6 years of age 0.188 0.191 0.20 0.211 2.91 0.204 3.20
Children 7–17 years of age 0.204 0.283 4.15 0.222 2.24 0.197 −1.30
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Table 5 Means of controls for females by participation in ALMPs and two-sample t test
statistics of equality with the non-participation group (Continued)
No children 0.338 0.334 −0.17 0.329 −0.97 0.274 −10.78
Single 0.329 0.348 0.93 0.357 2.96 0.325 −0.70
Working experience up to 1 year 0.245 0.425 8.62 0.223 −2.64 0.159 −16.97
Working experience 1–3 years 0.126 0.156 1.98 0.100 −4.22 0.078 −12.46
Working experience 3 years or more 0.072 0.065 −0.67 0.046 −6.08 0.049 −7.95
Lives in provincial town municipality 0.327 0.549 10.51 0.491 16.70 0.317 −1.62
Lives in a rural district 0.114 0.146 2.12 0.186 9.54 0.085 −7.59
Danish education 0.176 0.228 2.93 0.221 5.60 0.118 −12.86
Years of Danish education 1.815 2.313 2.72 2.225 4.95 1.167 −14.21
Foreign education 0.334 0.340 0.31 0.360 2.83 0.374 6.45
Years of foreign education 3.755 3.803 0.21 4.063 2.74 4.121 4.91
No visits to doctors 0.142 0.101 −3.20 0.143 0.03 0.175 6.77
5-9 visits to doctors 0.274 0.287 0.68 0.262 −1.37 0.260 −2.33
10-19 visits to doctors 0.222 0.208 −0.81 0.217 −0.63 0.216 −1.13
20 or more visits to doctors 0.080 0.045 −3.85 0.074 −1.10 0.069 −3.15
Local unemployment rate x 10 0.619 0.634 2.27 0.628 2.96 0.624 2.56
Social assistance spell began 1998 0.187 0.161 −1.63 0.201 1.74 0.203 2.98
Social assistance spell began 1999 0.169 0.211 2.44 0.200 3.91 0.190 4.11
Social assistance spell began 2000 0.110 0.122 0.91 0.115 0.80 0.107 −0.64
Social assistance spell began 2001 0.111 0.075 −3.24 0.106 −0.94 0.104 −1.73
Social assistance spell began 2002 0.103 0.090 −1.06 0.096 −1.15 0.087 −4.04
Social assistance spell began 2003 0.103 0.045 −6.39 0.060 −8.88 0.073 −8.17
Note. The columns denoted t show the two-sample t test statistics of equal means between spells characterized by
participation in each of the three types of ALMPs and spells without ALMP participation.
Table 6 Means of controls for males by participation in ALMPs and two-sample t test
statistics of equality with the non-participation group
No ALMP Wage subsidy Direct employment Other ALMPs
Variable mean mean t mean t mean t
Years since migration: 5-9 0.238 0.209 −2.47 0.229 −1.16 0.219 −3.56
Years since migration: 10-19 0.245 0.226 −1.62 0.233 −1.65 0.210 −6.65
Years since migration: 20- 0.180 0.164 −1.51 0.178 −0.33 0.167 −2.67
From Turkey 0.119 0.138 1.94 0.111 −1.40 0.097 −5.60
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia) 0.078 0.089 1.36 0.116 7.02 0.078 −0.09
From Africa (except Somalia) 0.085 0.063 −3.16 0.056 −7.01 0.084 −0.11
From Somalia 0.110 0.072 −5.24 0.101 −1.74 0.164 11.86
From American countries 0.017 0.012 −1.79 0.016 −0.45 0.018 0.36
From Afghanistan 0.021 0.021 0.05 0.021 0.28 0.029 3.95
From Iraq 0.110 0.087 −2.94 0.105 −0.97 0.152 9.43
From Iran 0.067 0.065 −0.23 0.056 −2.57 0.055 −3.81
From Sri Lanka 0.027 0.021 −1.45 0.038 3.53 0.013 −8.71
From other Asian countries 0.047 0.033 −2.76 0.049 0.45 0.035 −4.77
From Pakistan 0.040 0.023 −3.95 0.025 −4.97 0.036 −1.67
From Libanon 0.087 0.091 0.53 0.092 1.13 0.084 −0.87
From other countries 0.043 0.038 −0.88 0.040 −0.93 0.045 0.80
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Table 6 Means of controls for males by participation in ALMPs and two-sample t test
statistics of equality with the non-participation group (Continued)
Family reunified to a refugee 0.041 0.041 0.05 0.044 0.87 0.053 4.56
Family reunified to non-refugee 0.104 0.095 −1.12 0.075 −6.28 0.093 −3.09
EU residence permit 0.021 0.015 −1.92 0.013 −4.15 0.020 −0.78
Unknown type of residence permit 0.355 0.312 −3.28 0.345 −1.13 0.311 −7.40
Age 16-24 0.195 0.216 1.78 0.203 1.13 0.159 −7.63
Age 25-34 0.371 0.380 0.68 0.367 −0.50 0.402 4.96
Age 35-44 0.303 0.317 1.06 0.320 2.13 0.319 2.69
Children 3–6 years of age 0.120 0.125 0.52 0.131 1.86 0.122 0.62
Children 7–17 years of age 0.122 0.148 2.66 0.133 1.87 0.121 −0.24
No children 0.543 0.522 −1.55 0.503 −4.59 0.506 −5.82
Single 0.430 0.417 −0.92 0.421 −0.99 0.403 −4.29
Working experience up to 1 year 0.291 0.397 7.72 0.267 −3.04 0.228 −11.35
Working experience 1–3 years 0.189 0.191 0.18 0.156 −5.14 0.139 −10.95
Working experience 3 years or more 0.129 0.129 −0.07 0.107 −4.09 0.095 −8.71
Lives in provincial town municipality 0.321 0.474 10.85 0.464 16.62 0.258 −10.99
Lives in a rural district 0.096 0.133 3.80 0.155 9.49 0.068 −8.35
Danish education 0.231 0.217 −1.16 0.228 −0.31 0.173 −11.62
Years of Danish education 2.352 2.202 −1.24 2.265 −1.17 1.735 −12.00
Foreign education 0.316 0.335 1.44 0.323 0.86 0.350 5.63
Years of foreign education 3.850 4.243 2.25 3.900 0.48 4.254 5.24
No visits to doctors 0.237 0.265 2.23 0.224 −1.78 0.255 3.24
5-9 visits to doctors 0.207 0.204 −0.29 0.206 −0.16 0.207 0.02
10-19 visits to doctors 0.111 0.083 −3.47 0.116 0.93 0.099 −3.03
20 or more visits to doctors 0.028 0.017 −2.72 0.021 −2.72 0.021 −3.36
Local unemployment rate x 10 0.620 0.643 5.10 0.635 5.34 0.619 −0.49
Social assistance spell began 1998 0.188 0.201 1.18 0.221 4.61 0.201 2.62
Social assistance spell began 1999 0.178 0.227 4.16 0.207 4.15 0.216 7.41
Social assistance spell began 2000 0.112 0.091 −2.50 0.112 0.00 0.113 0.42
Social assistance spell began 2001 0.108 0.080 −3.60 0.099 −1.75 0.104 −1.18
Social assistance spell began 2002 0.101 0.070 −4.25 0.088 −2.70 0.083 −5.04
Social assistance spell began 2003 0.091 0.045 −7.68 0.049 −10.54 0.066 −7.64
Note. The columns denoted t show the two-sample t test statistics of equal means between spells characterized by
participation in each of the three types of ALMPs and spells without ALMP participation.
Table 7 Estimated parameters for controls in the hazard rate to employment
Females Males
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Years since migration: 5-9 0.276 0.038 *** 0.134 0.029 ***
Years since migration: 10-19 0.008 0.053 −0.102 0.040 ***
Years since migration: 20- −0.126 0.050 *** −0.092 0.038 ***
From Turkey −0.455 0.063 *** −0.228 0.049 ***
From Europe (except former Yugoslavia) −0.353 0.060 *** −0.322 0.048 ***
From Africa (except Somalia) −0.360 0.067 *** −0.267 0.051 ***
From Somalia −0.971 0.071 *** −0.532 0.048 ***
From American countries −0.176 0.094 * −0.275 0.092 ***
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Table 7 Estimated parameters for controls in the hazard rate to employment (Continued)
From Afghanistan −0.574 0.124 *** −0.249 0.076 ***
From Iraq −0.851 0.076 *** −0.458 0.044 ***
From Iran −0.253 0.075 *** −0.176 0.052 ***
From Sri Lanka 0.226 0.077 *** 0.057 0.065
From other Asian countries −0.119 0.062 * −0.170 0.056 ***
From Pakistan −0.676 0.084 *** −0.135 0.063 **
From Libanon −0.998 0.084 *** −0.485 0.052 ***
From other countries −0.588 0.082 *** −0.388 0.056 ***
Family reunified to a refugee −0.262 0.058 *** −0.110 0.063 *
Family reunified to non-refugee 0.074 0.052 0.117 0.044 ***
EU residence permit 0.082 0.079 −0.011 0.079
Unknown type of residence permit −0.145 0.050 *** −0.288 0.037 ***
Age 16-24 1.221 0.061 *** 1.132 0.048 ***
Age 25-34 1.068 0.050 *** 0.799 0.037 ***
Age 35-44 0.803 0.048 *** 0.475 0.034 ***
Children 3–6 years of age 0.299 0.038 *** 0.109 0.032 ***
Children 7–17 years of age 0.544 0.042 *** 0.214 0.035 ***
No children 0.415 0.039 *** 0.035 0.034
Single −0.163 0.029 *** −0.095 0.031 ***
Working experience up to 1 year 1.675 0.035 *** 1.296 0.028 ***
Working experience 1–3 years 1.860 0.044 *** 1.667 0.033 ***
Working experience 3 years or more 1.776 0.058 *** 1.779 0.042 ***
Lives in provincial town municipality −0.078 0.032 *** 0.026 0.024
Lives in a rural district 0.111 0.045 *** 0.167 0.037 ***
Danish education −1.536 0.142 *** −1.280 0.114 ***
Years of Danish education 0.178 0.012 *** 0.126 0.010 ***
Foreign education −0.420 0.087 *** −0.387 0.078 ***
Years of foreign education 0.052 0.007 *** 0.044 0.006 ***
No visits to doctors −0.163 0.043 *** 0.024 0.025
5-9 visits to doctors −0.083 0.031 *** −0.152 0.025 ***
10-19 visits to doctors −0.346 0.035 *** −0.512 0.033 ***
20 or more visits to doctors −0.651 0.054 *** −0.899 0.067 ***
Local unemployment rate x 10 −0.620 0.135 *** −0.689 0.107 ***
Social assistance spell began 1998 −0.075 0.044 * −0.117 0.034 ***
Social assistance spell began 1999 −0.162 0.052 *** −0.211 0.040 ***
Social assistance spell began 2000 −0.047 0.058 −0.141 0.045 ***
Social assistance spell began 2001 −0.236 0.062 *** −0.207 0.049 ***
Social assistance spell began 2002 −0.267 0.064 *** −0.441 0.051 ***
Social assistance spell began 2003 −0.355 0.061 *** −0.415 0.048 ***
Duration 0–3 months −5.432 0.153 *** −4.171 0.118 ***
Duration 3–6 months −6.168 0.154 *** −4.931 0.120 ***
Duration 6–12 months −6.406 0.152 *** −5.113 0.119 ***
Duration 12–24 months −6.751 0.151 *** −5.410 0.118 ***
Duration 24- months −7.033 0.150 *** −5.811 0.118 ***
Note. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last five variables are the duration
dependent constant terms. See the note to Table 4 for reference categories of the explanatory variables.
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Table 8 Characteristics of ALMP spells used to calculate marginal effects: Quartiles in the
distributions of duration of social assistance spells until start of programme and time
spent in the programme
Females Males
Quartile First Second Third First Second Third
Duration until start of programme (in months)
Employment with wage subsidy 2 5 11 2 5 11
Direct employment programme 2 7 19 2 5 13
Other programmes 3 11 26 2 6 16
Duration of programme (in months)
Employment with wage subsidy 3 5 7 3 5 7
Direct employment programme 2 5 7 2 3 6
Other programmes 2 4 9 2 3 6
Table 9 Estimates of effects of participation in ALMPs on the hazard rate to employment
in a model with more narrow intervals of the piecewise-constant baseline hazard
Females Males
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
ALMP spell begins less than 6 months after start of social assistance spell
In-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy −0.0618 0.1516 −0.0976 0.0904
Direct employment programme 0.5811 0.0697 *** 0.4853 0.0534 ***
Other ALMPs 0.2978 0.0626 *** 0.2483 0.0448 ***
Post-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 1.6260 0.1321 *** 1.3049 0.0803 ***
Direct employment programme 0.8608 0.0903 *** 0.4841 0.0714 ***
Other ALMPs 0.3720 0.0774 *** 0.2295 0.0571 ***
ALMP spell begins at least 6 months after start of social assistance spell
In-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 1.4357 0.1787 *** 0.8866 0.1103 ***
Direct employment programme 1.6456 0.0687 *** 1.1638 0.0607 ***
Other ALMPs 1.0102 0.0560 *** 0.7876 0.0506 ***
Post-programme effects:
Employment with wage subsidy 2.5392 0.1264 *** 1.9692 0.0765 ***
Direct employment programme 1.3905 0.0859 *** 0.5235 0.0863 ***
Other ALMPs 0.5991 0.0697 *** 0.3844 0.0608 ***
Note: *** indicate significance at the 1% level.
The piecewise-constant intervals of the baseline hazard step functions are less wide than in the main model
(see Tables 2 and 7): 0–2, 2–4, 4–6, 6–9, 9–12, 12–24 and 24- months.
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